2 events. 2 As for propaganda, the European Commission has promoted a wide range of media campaigns, especially on the occasion of major changes such as introduction of the euro. Less episodically, it is this propagandistic purpose that lies behind many of EU's cultural policies such as the designation of the 'European Years' or a European capital of culture. 3 Last but not least, there is 'banal Europeanism' hinged on an array of different tools. Some of them have a deliberate identitarian connotation: the European flag, the European anthem, Europe Day (on the 9th of May, anniversary of the Schuman Declaration). Others were put in place for different purposes: for instance, the common currency or free movement rights. But have these policies had any effects on bolstering a European identity?
In this paper, I concentrate on free movement, arguing that it has a very strong potential of fostering a sense of 'Europeanness'. The starting point of my argument rests on psychogeographical knowledge, according to which humans are territorial beings. The localization of life-worlds nurtures a sense of spatial confidence that tends to turn into spatial attachment. 4 Permanence in a physical context breeds adaptation, familiarity, and eventually an attachment to it. This, in turn, substantiates the taken-for-granted nature of its institutions, thus contributing to the legitimacy of on-going collective arrangements, including political ones.
5
In other words, people's inclination to be attached to the places where they spend or have spent their life -the places that constitute an individual's 'space-set' 6 -fits in with intentional activities of power-holders to demand legitimacy for the existing political order inasmuch as such order coincides geographically with the subjects' (or citizens') space-set. Concretely, loyalty to a given country is higher if people have a first-hand experience of that country's territory (and especially of symbolically core places). One of the latent functions of conscription has always been to socialize youth Press, 1977) ; RD Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986) ; J Lévy, Lespace légitime. Sur la dimension géographique de la fonction politique (Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1994); A Moles and E Rohmer, Psychosociologie de l'espace (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998 In his view, nation-building comes about mainly through the construction of 'infrastructures' which facilitate economic and social exchanges within territorial boundaries. Infrastructures create 'societies', while communication and culture create 'communities'. But the latter cannot exist without the former. The sense of belonging to a nation grows out of the intensification of social relations within it. In a nation-centered world, co-nationals interact with each other more than they do with people external to the nation, thereby strengthening their sense of solidarity and common destiny. Once people start to communicate regularly and cluster across national borders, however, their spatially-bounded connections trigger a reconfiguration of collective attachments. Deutsch accordingly notes that 'boundaries are not just lines on a map […] what really makes a boundary is a sharp drop in the frequency of some relevant transaction flow '. 9 As in the case of incipient nations, the expansion of economic, social and cultural exchanges across the boundaries of pre-existing polities is expected to lead to the formation of 'security communities' -one of which was the newborn European Economic Community, which Deutsch held could progressively endow itself with a collective identity through increased transnational interactions. The second hypothesis drew on Karl Deutsch's argument of the effect of cross-border activities on individual outlooks: the more people engage in transnational practices, the more they are likely to adopt a supranational identification. To test the hypothesis, I will rely on data from Eurobarometer 73 of 2010 that record a list of ten possible individual cross-border behaviours (from watching foreign tv to travelling abroad: see below). Multilevel logistic regression will control whether the more people act transnationally, the more they feel attached to Europe.
To begin with, I will present the analyses which compare the sense of belonging to Europe between movers and stayers. A key point to bear in mind is that EU movers form a small fraction of Europeans. EU citizens resident in another member state hover around 3 per cent of the total population.
12
This makes it impracticable to study their characteristics, behaviours, and attitudes using data from sample surveys conducted with random criteria on the entire population: even in large-scale surveys, the absolute number of sampled cases would be rather modest. A solution is to combine data from population surveys with data from ad hoc surveys on migrants that deal with the same phenomena using the same indicators. This is the strategy adopted here, by merging Eurobarometer data with data from the European Internal Movers' Social Survey (EIMSS) and Moveact surveys, which 11 A methodological caveat is in order: cross-sectional survey data (that is, collected at one particular time) cannot be used to establish conclusively whether this possible difference is due directly to the experience of mobility or to other factors that preceded it. Only longitudinal information collected before and after migration would settle the question. However, there are theoretical reasons (illustrated in the previous section) that do justify the expectation that the experience of cross-border mobility fosters supranational identifications rather than the other way around. were designed to make this operation possible. 14 None of the 2011 Eurobarometers contain the dependent variable common to all the other surveys: the question on 'attachment to Europe'. I therefore had to rely on the survey closest in time able to ensure full comparability: the Eurobarometer 73.3 of March-April 2010. Moreover, to be precise, in the latter survey the response item was not phrased as 'Europe' but rather as the 'European Union'. This is an unfortunate change which must be factored in, but -also in consideration of the question structure, which is for the rest unaltered -I assume it to be an analogously trustworthy measurement of the European component of identification. Unfortunately, the two datasets do not contain data relative to values and political attitudes that might be important (for instance, self-placement on the right-left scale).
17
But information regarding the other competing political-territorial identities is indeed available. Analysis reveals that strong regional and national identities -to which local ones were also added in 2011 -are associated with attachment to Europe. This may be 15
Caution is needed when interpreting parameters of logistic regressions conducted on different samples, see: C Mood, 'Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and What We Can Do About It' (2010) 26 European Sociological Review 67. As long as it cannot be assumed that unobserved heterogeneity is the same across such samples, effects cannot be compared properly. In this light, the two models examined here (and in following analyses of this chapter) must be read as two parallel takes on the issue rather than a way to gauge changes in the influence of only apparently comparable factors. This classification of transnational behaviours according to their intensity seems to be the best one possible given the indicators available in Eb73. In theoretical terms, I have elsewhere proposed a more composite classification which rests on a fundamental distinction between transnationalism practices which depend on physical mobility (long/brief residence abroad) and virtual mobility (personal/impersonal), see: E Recchi, 'Pathways to European Identity Formation: A Tale of Two Models' (2014) 27 Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 119. Another classification distinguishes three dimensions of transnationalism relative to background, practices, and human capital, see: T Kuhn 'Individual -Had worked abroad for more than three months (15 per cent); -Had studied abroad for more than three months (15 per cent); -Had lived abroad for more than three months (for reasons other than work or study) (15 per cent); -Had or had had a partner who was or had been a citizen of another country (15 per cent); -Normally spent holidays abroad (10 per cent); -Owned property abroad (10 per cent); -Had family members living abroad (5 per cent); -Had friends living abroad (5 per cent); -Regularly followed news about another country (5 per cent); -Regularly cooked typical dishes of another country (5 per The first model does not include the independent variables of interest -that is, the experience of international mobility (having lived abroad for more than three months) and the individual transnationalism index -so as to highlight their separate explanatory power.
In general, multilevel models are used if it is believed that the parameters relative to the individual factors do not vary independently but according to patterns typical of the higher-order units -in the present case, countries. The analysis is thus able to account for a more complex variability compared with the non-hierarchical models employed previously, given the larger number of countries considered (the then 27 member states of the EU). Differently from previous models, in this analysis the 'international mobility' variable is not restricted to current mobility but also includes past experiences, and it is not limited to movements within the EU but to any possible foreign country. Moreover, the sample is the EU-wide Eurobarometer, and not a casecontrol combination of two different surveys as before. All this provides an even stronger test of the mobility-supranational identity link.
22
In the logistic regression models estimated previously, by contrast, the number of countries was too small to use hierarchical models, see MR Steenbergen and BS Jones, 'Modeling Multilevel Data Structures' (2002) 46 American Journal of Political Science 218, 219. Moreover, EU movers and stayers share nationality but not residence: therefore, a common dependence on the context would have been an unrealistic assumption. noted that the same social categories -young people, more highly educated individuals, and members of the upper social strata -figure among the most pro-Europe and transnational citizens. 27 However, because his analysis was conducted on separate data, he was unable to prove that the two phenomena were indeed associated (i.e., that the supporters of European integration and the Europeans with the most experience of mobility were the same people). A German pioneer study found that cross-border mobility and practices go hand in hand with cosmopolitan 28 identification. Interestingly, another German study indicates that the transnationalism-cosmopolitanism association is stronger among ordinary citizens than it is in the elite.
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This probably reflects a ceiling effect, as the members of the elite are homogenously highly transnational.
30
The most powerful study on the transnationalism-Europeanness association is however Kuhn's. 
III Conclusion
Collective politico-territorial identification is a pre-condition for the legitimacy of any political order -and all the more so of democracies. The EU has suffered from this However, these findings must be placed in perspective: Intra-EU mobility and individual transnationalism remain minority phenomena and this puts a brake to their culturally integrating effects, in two senses. First, demographically individuals who have an opportunity to enlarge their 'space-sets' to a EU-wide scale are still a tiny proportion of the European population. In particular, free movement can be an engine of Europeanness, but its horsepower so far has not been sufficient to act as a locomotive of further identitarian integration. Second, ideologically: because the stratified nature of intra-EU mobility and transnational practices (involving mostly the highly educated, young and more privileged strata of the population) generates an anti-mobility reaction in the most sedentary part of the citizenry. One of Kuhn's finding mentioned above -which she appropriately terms "the Janus face" of expanding transnationalism 32 -warns that a legitimacy crisis can also be triggered by unintended backlash effects of a more mobile world. Mobility can bring about a divide between an ever more globalized upper class and a comparatively localized mass resenting the lack of transnationally generated opportunities. This 'local-cosmopolitan' polarization, well known to classic American 32 Kuhn (note 31) 127.
